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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the implications of the introduction of the co-decision procedure for the 
European Union‟s Common Agricultural Policy and its reform. We use a game-theoretical 
model of the legislative procedures in the European Union and show that the move from 
consultation to co-decision implies a shift of power from the Commission to the European 
Parliament. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy depend on the 
configuration of preferences, the location of the status quo, and the bargaining powers in the 
Conciliation Committee. If the member states and the European Parliament are more opposed 
to reform than is the Commission, the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for 
reform of the European Union‟s Common Agricultural Policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
2011 is a crucial year for the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
European Union (EU). A new reform is being prepared. Past reforms of the CAP have been 
extensively studied and analyzed. A key issue in the current discussions is the impact of 
changes in the EU decision-making structure. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) changed the rules 
under which agricultural policy is set in the EU. Specifically, it altered the influence of the 
European Parliament (EP) on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in two important ways: 
it expanded the EP‟s role in the budgetary process; and it modified the legislative procedure 
that applies to the CAP, introducing co-decision to replace consultation.
1
 In this paper we 
focus on the latter modification. 
Co-decision was first introduced in 1992 in a number of policy areas other than the 
CAP. To this date this move represents the most important step in the EP‟s process of 
legislative empowerment. Co-decision formally recognizes the parity between the Council 
and the EP as legislative bodies, granting the latter a continued involvement in the legislative 
process. This is an important difference with the consultation procedure, in which EP 
intervention is only consultative in a specific and defined stage of the procedure. The 
application of co-decision to the CAP may have important effects on the possibility of CAP 
reforms. In earlier CAP reforms political and institutional changes also played an important 
role (Swinnen, 2008). 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the implications of the adoption of co-
decision for future CAP reform. Several studies have evaluated the increasing influence of the 
EP on EU policy outcomes. Some provide a descriptive account of this increasing influence. 
They consider how treaty modifications have affected the distribution of powers among EU 
institutions, and then explain how the EP has been able to exploit its new powers to increase 
 3 
its impact on legislation (Shackleton, 2000, Corbett et. al, 2003, Maurer, 2003). Others 
approach the problem analytically. For example, they consider the number of amendments 
successfully proposed by the EP under different procedures as a measure of its legislative 
power (Earnshaw and Judge 1993, 1997; Judge and Earnshaw, 1994; Moser, 1996, Kreppel, 
1999). However, none of these studies focus on the role of the EP in the CAP. 
An empirical study of the EP‟s influence on the CAP and the likelihood of CAP 
reform under co-decision requires a large database on different issues involved in the CAP 
and the way they have been settled under consultation and co-decision. Since co-decision has 
only been applied to the CAP since December 2009, we cannot compare the numbers of 
successful EP amendments on the CAP under consultation and co-decision to evaluate the 
EP‟s powers under co-decision and the likelihood of CAP reform. At this point there is 
merely some anecdotal evidence that the EP is behaving differently under co-decision, 
moving away from position-taking and toward responsible policy-making, and acquiring 
more influence in the process.   
For these reasons we use a theoretical approach based on spatial models. Such models 
explain policy outcomes as a function of the legislative procedures, the preferences of the 
political actors and the location of the status quo (Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994; 
Crombez 1996, 1997, 2000). Spatial models have also been applied to the CAP to study how 
the institutional setting increases or depresses the likelihood of reform (de Gorter et al., 1998; 
Pokrivcak et al. 2001; Henning and Latacz-Lohmann, 2004; Pokrivcak et al. 2006).  
Spatial models are particularly effective in reproducing the conditions that a procedure 
imposes for the adoption of a specific policy. Moreover, they make it possible to evaluate the 
room for policy reform the procedure allows, and provide valuable insights in the powers of 
the actors involved in the procedure. Furthermore, the different models‟ results are easily 
comparable. 
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 To evaluate the implications of the adoption of co-decision for the CAP we apply two 
spatial models proposed by Crombez (1996, 2000) to the CAP. More specifically, we 
highlight the changes imposed by the new procedure in terms of the room for policy reform 
and the institutions‟ powers. We evaluate the impact of co-decision on CAP decision- making 
by focusing on policy scenarios that are suitable for the CAP.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section two we discuss the main differences 
between consultation and co-decision focusing on the effects of the procedures on the formal 
roles of the institutions. In section three we present the main results of the spatial models for 
consultation and co-decision, and apply them to the CAP. Section four discusses the 
implications of the introduction of co-decision for CAP reform. We conclude with some final 
remarks in section five. 
 
2. The Consultation and Co-decision Procedures  
 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the CAP‟s legislative procedure was the “consultation” 
procedure. Consultation starts with a legislative proposal presented by the Commission. The 
Commission submits the proposal to the EP and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). 
Those bodies have a consultative role. The ESC expresses its opinion over the proposed 
legislation, whereas the EP can propose amendments. The EP amendments are evaluated by 
the Commission which may or may not include them in its proposal.  
The proposal is then submitted to the Council. For the evaluation of the proposal the 
Council works with its Special Committee on Agriculture, the body in which the member 
states (MSs) discuss technical rather than political aspects of agricultural policy. This 
Committee plays the same role as the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which 
consists of the MSs‟ Ambassadors to the EU, does in other policy areas. The Council votes on 
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the proposal under qualified majority rule. Each MS can propose amendments which are 
voted under unanimity rule.
2
  
In sum, under consultation the Commission formulates proposals that need the support 
of a qualified majority in the Council for adoption. The Council can amend proposals by 
unanimity. The EP and ESC are consulted, but their opinions and amendments can be 
ignored. For that reason we do not further consider their roles in our analytical model of the 
consultation procedure.  
The sequence of events under consultation can then be represented as in Figure 1. 
First, the Commission proposes a policy. Next, the MSs can propose amendments. We 
assume for simplicity that only one MS k is selected to propose an amendment, and that it can 
decide whether or not to use that opportunity. If it does propose an amendment, the 
amendment subsequently needs unanimity in the Council for adoption. Finally, the MSs can 
approve the (amended) proposal by qualified majority. If it is approved, it becomes EU law. 
Otherwise the status quo prevails. 
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
The situation is very different under the co-decision procedure, which was first 
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The use of co-decision was extended by the 
Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties, in 1997, 2001 and 2007.
3
 It applies to the CAP since 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
Under co-decision a Commission proposal is submitted to the Council and the EP for a 
first reading. The first reading is similar to consultation: the EP can propose amendments, the 
Commission can subsequently choose whether to include them in its proposal, and finally the 
Council votes on the proposal. The Council can approve the proposal by qualified majority, 
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whereas unanimity is required for amendments. If the EP and the Council pass the same 
version of the proposal, the proposal is adopted.  If they pass different versions, however, the 
process moves on to a second reading.  
The second reading is similar to the first. Once again, if the EP and the Council pass 
the same version of the proposal, it is adopted. If they pass different versions, however, a 
Conciliation Committee is convened in what is usually referred to as the third reading. In the 
Conciliation Committee representatives of the EP and the Council directly negotiate a 
compromise, referred to as a “joint text”. The joint text needs to be approved by the EP and a 
qualified majority in the Council for adoption. If conciliation fails to reach an agreement, the 
procedure is at an end and no proposal is adopted.  
In sum, under co-decision the Commission formulates proposals that need the support 
of the EP and a qualified majority in the Council for adoption. Moreover, the EP and a 
qualified majority can together amend proposals in the Conciliation Committee.
4
  
 
Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of events under co-decision. First, the Commission 
formulates a proposal. Next, the EP gets to vote on the proposal, and then the MSs vote on it 
(by qualified majority). These two steps are considered as the first reading. The second 
reading is analytically irrelevant, because it is similar to the first. For that reason it is not 
represented in Figure 2. Subsequently, the Conciliation Committee meets and negotiates a 
joint text. For simplicity we assume that the EP proposes the joint text.
5
 In reality the MSs 
could also be formulating it, and there may be different rounds of proposals and amendments, 
but the results would not be significantly different. Finally, the MSs vote on the joint text. The 
joint text becomes EU policy if it is approved by a qualified majority. Otherwise the status 
quo prevails.  
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
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Hence, compared to the consultation procedure, the co-decision procedure enhances 
the EP‟s role in two important ways. First, it gives the EP a veto right on legislation. At no 
stage in the process can a proposal be adopted without the consent of the EP. Second, the EP 
and the Council can together amend Commission proposals. In contrast to the EP, with the 
shift to the co-decision procedure, the Commission lost much of its formal influence over the 
legislative process, especially in the Conciliation Committee.  
 
3. The Model 
 
We now develop a formal spatial model of CAP decision making under consultation and co-
decision.  The policy space P  consists of one dimension that corresponds to a policy 
issue. Alternative policies can thus be represented by points in a one-dimensional policy 
space.
6
 The policies could consist of different CAP subsidy levels, for example. Decision 
making can then be thought of as choosing a point in the policy space.  The political actors 
are: the MSs in the Council; the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); and the 
Commissioners. They have Euclidean preferences over EU policy PpEU  . Actor j then has 
the following utility function: 
2)()( EUjEUj pppU  , where Pp j   is actor j‟s ideal 
policy. That is, actor j has an ideal policy pj and prefers policies that are closer to, rather than 
farther away from, its ideal policy.  
The EP and the Commission use simple majority rule and have no restrictions on 
amendments. They can thus be represented as unitary actors with ideal policies equal to the 
ideal policies of the median MEP EPp  and median Commissioner Cp , respectively.
7
 The 
median MEP and all MEPs on her left (right) prefer the median MEP‟s ideal policy to any 
policy right (left) of it. Under majority rule the median MEP‟s ideal policy thus defeats any 
other policy in a pairwise comparison. A similar argument holds for the Commission. The 
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analysis can thus be simplified by focusing on the median Commissioner and the median 
MEP. 
The Council is not represented as a unitary actor because it uses qualified majority or 
unanimity rule. A qualified majority in the Council consists of 255 out of a total of 345 
votes.
8
 Nonetheless, the analysis can be simplified by focusing on the MSs that are pivotal 
under the qualified majority rule. MS a that is pivotal for a move to the right has an ideal 
policy to the left of the MS with the median vote. In particular, MS a is the MS with the 91st 
vote (from the left). MS a and the MSs to its right then have 255 votes, and the MSs to its 
right do not constitute a qualified majority without MS a. The MS b that is pivotal for a move 
to the left is the MS with the 255th vote. Under unanimity rule the two most extreme MSs, the 
leftmost MS 1 and the rightmost MS n, are pivotal for moves to the right and left respectively. 
The sequence of events in CAP decision making was discussed in the previous section 
and depends on the legislative procedure that applies. In our analysis, we assume complete 
and perfect information. The actors, i.e., the MSs, the EP and the Commission know each 
other's preferences, the location of the status quo q, the impact of proposed policies, the 
sequential structure of the models, and the actions taken in prior stages of the models.  
An equilibrium consists of a strategy for each actor. Strategies tell the actors what 
actions to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the actions taken in prior 
stages. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no actor can 
achieve a higher utility by choosing another strategy, given the other actors‟ strategies. In a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, actors can do no better than stick to their strategies in any 
stage of the procedure, even if an actor deviated from the equilibrium strategy in a prior stage. 
The outcomes of the models are the policies that are adopted under the different 
procedures, given the preferences of the players and the location of the status quo. For the 
purposes of our analysis we will focus on the main results of the models in terms of the 
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potential for policy reform and the actors‟ powers. In the next subsections we first present the 
results for the consultation procedure, and then discuss co-decision. 
 
3.1. Consultation 
 
In the last stage of the consultation procedure the MSs thus vote on the proposal. The 
proposal needs qualified majority support to be adopted. If the status quo is to the right of MS 
b, as in Figure 3, MS b is pivotal. The set of proposals that can be adopted in the last stage, 
the “qualified majority set”, is then the set [2pb-q,q] of policies which MS b prefers to the 
status quo. In Figure 3 the Commission, MSs 1, a and b, and the EP are all to the left of the 
status quo. They all want lower agricultural subsidies, for example. The MS n wants higher 
subsidies, however. 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
Not all the proposals in the qualified majority set necessarily make it through the 
second and third stages of consultation, however. Amendments can be approved if all MSs 
prefer a policy to the left (right) of the proposal. For a proposal in the qualified majority set to 
get through the second and third stages of consultation it thus also needs to be in the 
“amendment set” [p1,pn], between the ideal policies of the two most extreme MSs. In Figure 3 
all policies that are in the qualified majority set are also in the amendment set. 
Under consultation the Commission proposal thus has to fulfill two requirements for 
adoption. First, it needs to be in the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by a 
qualified majority. Second, it has to be located between the ideal policies of the two extreme 
MSs. Suppose the Commission wants to lower CAP subsidy levels, for example. The 
Commission then needs to pay attention to the MS that is pivotal for such a lowering under 
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qualified majority rule. It can only reduce subsidies if this pivotal MS prefers such a lowering 
to the status quo, and can only go as far as this MS is willing to accept, that is, down to the 
level 2pb-q that makes that MS b indifferent to the status quo. Furthermore, the Commission 
cannot lower subsidies further than all MSs want ideally (lower than policy p1). Otherwise the 
MSs would amend its proposal.  
In equilibrium the Commission successfully proposes the policy CSEUp  that satisfies the 
two requirements mentioned above and is closest to its preferences. In Figure 3 this is its ideal 
policy. Its ideal policy is in the “consultation set”, the intersection of the qualified majority 
and amendment sets, and can thus be adopted under consultation. The result is summarized in 
Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1 Under consultation the Commission successfully proposes the policy it 
prefers most from among the policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified 
majority in the Council and are located between the ideal policies of the two extreme MSs. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Figure 4 shows how the equilibrium policy varies as a function of the location of the 
status quo. It illustrates the consultation procedure‟s implications for EU policy making, the 
potential for policy reform and the institutions‟ powers. In Figure 4 the equilibrium policies 
(on the Y-axis) predicted by the model are expressed as a function of the position of the status 
quo (on the X-axis). The function is represented by the bold lines. As in Figure 3 the 
Commission‟s ideal policy pc is located to the left of the ideal policies pa  and pb  of the MSs a 
and b that are pivotal under qualified majority rule. The EP‟s ideal policy pEP is to the right of 
those policies. This configuration of preferences is consistent with a situation in which the 
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Commission wants a lower CAP subsidy level than do the pivotal MSs, whereas the EP wants 
a higher subsidy level. 
 
--- Figure 4 about here --- 
 
In two intervals in Figure 4, intervals II and III, the equilibrium policy can be found on 
the diagonal line through the origin. In those intervals the status quo is maintained. That is, 
consultation does not lead to policy reform if the status quo is located in those intervals. In 
interval III the status quo is located between the preferred policies of the two pivotal MSs 
under qualified majority rule. MS a (b) is pivotal for a move to the right (left), but wants a 
policy that is to the left (right) of the policies in interval III. As a result the Council cannot 
agree on the direction of change. The status quo thus prevails in interval III. In the CAP this 
occurs, for example, when no qualified majority is in favor of lowering subsidies, and no 
qualified majority is in favor of increasing them either. 
The status quo also prevails in interval II but for different reasons. In this case MS a 
and a qualified majority want a move to the right, but the Commission is to the left and thus 
prefers the status quo to a move to the right. For example, a qualified majority wants higher 
CAP subsidies, but the Commission wants to lower them. For that reason the Commission 
does not propose a move to the right. Moreover, the Council cannot amend a status quo 
proposal by the Commission, because MS 1 wants to move to the left, unlike the other MSs 
shown in Figure 3. The status quo thus prevails in interval II. 
In the intervals where the outcome of the procedure is not the status quo the 
Commission has considerable powers. If the status quo is located at the extremes, as it is in 
intervals I and V, the Commission can successfully propose its ideal policy pc . In interval I 
the status quo is to the left of the Commission‟s ideal policy, whereas MS a and a qualified 
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majority are to the right of the Commission. MS a and a qualified majority will thus vote in 
favor of the Commission‟s ideal policy. This situation would occur in the CAP if subsidies 
were very low, the Commission preferred higher subsidies, and the pivotal MSs wanted even 
higher subsidy levels.  
In interval V the status quo is far enough to the right for MS b to prefer the 
Commission‟s ideal policy to the status quo. MS b and a qualified majority will thus vote in 
favor of the Commission‟s ideal policy.  This corresponds to a situation in which CAP 
subsidies are very high, the MSs and the Commission want lower subsidies, and the pivotal 
MSs prefer the Commission‟s ideal level to the status quo. 
In intermediate locations, in interval IV, MS b prefers the status quo to the 
Commission‟s ideal policy. So, the Commission cannot successfully propose its ideal. 
Nonetheless, it can move policy to the left, because MS b wants to move to the left. It thus 
successfully proposes the policy farthest to the left that MS b approves. This is the policy that 
makes MS b indifferent to the status quo. This corresponds to a situation in which the 
Commission wants to lower subsidies and a qualified majority in the Council wants that too, 
but the qualified majority does not want to lower subsidies down to the level that the 
Commission wants ideally. In that case the Commission moves subsidies down to the level 
that just gains qualified majority support. 
In sum we can say the following about the Commission‟s powers under consultation. 
If no qualified majority wants to move in the same direction, the Commission cannot 
successfully propose a policy other than the status quo (as in interval III). The Commission 
can preserve the status quo, if a qualified majority in the Council wants to move in the 
opposite direction it wants itself (as in interval II). It can impose its ideal policy only if it is 
supported by a qualified majority (as in intervals I and V). This is the case for extreme status 
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quos. In other circumstances it can move policy in the direction it wants and obtain the policy 
that makes the pivotal MS indifferent to the status quo (as in interval IV). 
The model also demonstrates that reform is not always possible, in particular in 
situations with intermediate positions of the status quo with respect to the ideal policies of the 
MSs and the Commission, that is, if the status quo is located between the ideal policies of the 
pivotal MSs a and b and the Commission. Either no qualified majority can then agree on 
change, or the Commission cannot agree with a qualified majority.
9
 
 
3.2. Co-decision 
 
In the last stage of the co-decision procedure the MSs vote on the joint text, as shown 
in Figure 2. The joint text needs qualified majority support to be adopted. If MS b is to the left 
of the status quo, as in Figure 3, the set of joint texts that can be adopted in the last stage is the 
set [2pb-q,q] of policies MS b prefers to the status quo, the qualified majority set.  
In the penultimate stage the EP proposes a joint text. It proposes the policy it prefers 
most from among the policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority. In 
Figure 3 the EP successfully proposes its own ideal policy.  
When the EP and MSs vote on the Commission proposal in stages two and three of co-
decision, they look ahead and compare the proposal to the joint text the EP will formulate in 
the next stage. The proposal is approved if the EP and a qualified majority in the Council vote 
in favor. They vote in favor, if they prefer the proposal to the joint text. This implies that they 
prefer it to the status quo, because the joint text is preferred to the status quo. However, there 
is no policy that the EP likes better than the joint text from among the policies a qualified 
majority prefers to the status quo. As a result the Commission cannot formulate a proposal 
that is different from the joint text and is preferred to it by the EP and a qualified majority. 
Thus the Commission can do no better than propose the joint text. Formally this is equivalent 
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to saying that it has no impact on policy under co-decision. In equilibrium the joint text then 
becomes EU policy CDEUp  under co-decision. 
In reality MSs may be proposing the joint text, and the EP and the MSs may amend 
proposed joint texts. Therefore the joint text that is adopted is not necessarily the policy the 
EP prefers most from among the policies a qualified majority prefers to the status quo. It may 
be the policy a MS prefers most from among the policies the EP and a qualified majority 
prefer to the status quo. The set of policies the EP prefers to the status quo is referred to as the 
“EP set”. In Figure 3 it is a subset of the qualified majority set.  
In any case the joint text that is adopted, is preferred to the status quo by the EP and a 
qualified majority. Hence it is in both the qualified majority and EP sets. Moreover, no policy 
is preferred to it by the EP and a qualified majority. That is, it is in the “joint text set”, the set 
of policies that are located between the ideal policies of the EP and the MSs that are pivotal 
under qualified majority rule. If the joint text were not in the qualified majority and EP sets, it 
would not be approved. If it were not in the joint text set, an amendment would be proposed 
and approved. Agricultural subsidies, for example, can only be lowered as far as the EP and 
the pivotal MS are willing to accept. Furthermore, they cannot be reduced further than the EP 
and the pivotal MS want ideally. 
In Figure 3 the joint text set is the set [pa,pp]. No policy is preferred to the policies in 
this set by the EP and a qualified majority. The EP (weakly) prefers policies to the right of the 
set, but there is no qualified majority for such a move. The joint text is in this set even if the 
EP does not propose it. If the EP does get to formulate the joint text, it can obtain its ideal 
policy. Its ideal policy is in the “co-decision set”, the intersection of the qualified majority, EP 
and joint text sets. 
The precise location of the joint text within the joint text set depends on the bargaining 
powers of the institutions in the Conciliation Committee. To the extent that the Commission 
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has bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee, even though it has no voting rights in 
the Committee, it can also affect EU policy, within the joint text set. This could occur, for 
example, in an incomplete information world in which the Commission has private 
information.  
The result is summarized in Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2 Under co-decision the equilibrium EU policy is preferred to the status 
quo by the EP and a qualified majority in the Council and is located between the ideal 
policies of the EP and the MSs that are pivotal under qualified majority rule. The exact 
location of the equilibrium policy depends on the relative bargaining powers in the 
Conciliation Committee.  
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Figure 5 shows how the equilibrium policy under co-decision varies as a function of 
the location of the status quo for the same configuration of ideal policies as in Figure 4. The 
function is represented by the bold lines.  
 
--- Figure 5 about here --- 
 
Gridlock is an important feature of decision making under co-decision, as it was under 
consultation. In the context of our model gridlock refers to the status quo being maintained, 
whereas reform means a change away from the status quo. In intervals III and IV in Figure 5, 
, the status quo is maintained. In interval III the status quo is located between the preferred 
policies of the two pivotal MSs under qualified majority rule. As a result the Council cannot 
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agree on the direction of change, and the status quo prevails in internal III. In interval IV the 
EP does not agree with a qualified majority on the direction of change: MS b and a qualified 
majority want a move to the left, but the EP wants a move to the right. The status quo thus 
prevails in interval IV as well. 
In the other intervals the EP and a qualified majority do agree on the direction of 
change. If the status quo is located at the extremes, as in intervals I and V, the EP can 
successfully propose its ideal policy EPp . In interval I the status quo is far enough to the left 
for MS a to prefer the EP‟s ideal policy to the status quo. In interval V the status quo is to the 
right of the EP‟s ideal policy, and MS b‟s ideal policy is to the left of the EP‟s ideal policy.  
The EP will thus propose its ideal policy, and MS b and a qualified majority will vote in 
favor.  
In intermediate locations, in interval II, MS a prefers the status quo to the EP‟s ideal 
policy. So, the EP cannot successfully propose its ideal. Nonetheless, it can move policy to 
the right, because MS a wants to move to the right. It thus successfully proposes the policy 
farthest to the right that MS a approves. This is the policy that makes MS a indifferent to the 
status quo. 
Keep in mind that the precise location of the ultimate EU policy depends on the 
relative bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If MS b had all the bargaining 
powers in the Conciliation Committee, it would successfully propose its ideal policy in an 
expanded interval I. In interval V it would propose its ideal or the policy that makes the EP 
indifferent to the status quo. Whatever the bargaining powers of the EP and MSs in the 
Conciliation Committee, the outcome is always between the ideal policies of the pivotal MSs 
and the EP.  
The location of the status quo on the horizontal axis, relative the actors‟ preferences, is 
directly related to external changes that occur between two rounds of EU decision making. A 
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variety of changes, such as changes in market prices for food, production costs, environmental 
conditions, and EU enlargement, can affect the relative location of the status quo. Changes in 
preferences, as a result of EP elections, and the appointment of a new Commission and new 
MS governments, also affect the relative location. Without such changes the status quo cannot 
be outside the joint text set, and no new policy can be set. (Pokrivack, Crombez and Swinnen, 
2006). A more significant change in external conditions implies a lower likelihood of 
gridlock, and more power for the EP under co-decision (as was the case for the Commission 
under consultation). 
Summarizing we can say that under co-decision the Commission has lost much of its 
powers, because it plays no formal role in the Conciliation Committee. The EP, by contrast, 
has become a genuine co-legislator together with the Council. When there is considerable 
change in external conditions represented by the status quos in intervals I, II and V, the EP 
and the pivotal MSs can move EU policy considerably towards their ideal policies. The EP 
can block change against the will of a qualified majority in the Council (as in interval IV), but 
cannot move policy away from the status quo if no qualified majority agrees (as in interval 
III). 
Gridlock is rather important and, not surprisingly, involves situations in which the EP 
cannot agree on the direction of change with a qualified majority, or a qualified majority 
cannot agree within the Council.  
 
4. Implications for CAP Reform 
 
We now combine the previous insights to derive implications of the introduction of 
co-decision for the CAP reform. In particular we study the effects on the extent of gridlock, 
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the location of EU policy, and the institutions‟ powers. Furthermore, we discuss how these 
effects depend on the preferences of the EP.  
Under both legislative procedures there is gridlock if no qualified majority agrees on 
the direction of policy change. If there is no qualified majority in the Council in favor of CAP 
reform, it does not occur, whether it be under consultation or co-decision. The introduction of 
co-decision does not alter that.  
However, there are differences as a result of the different powers the institutions have 
under the two procedures. Under consultation there is gridlock if the Commission does not 
agree with a qualified majority. This type of gridlock does not occur under co-decision. 
Instead, co-decision leads to gridlock if the EP does not agree with a qualified majority.
10
 
Whether there is more gridlock, and thus less CAP reform, under co-decision than under 
consultation then depends on the locations of the ideal policies of the Commission and EP 
relative to the ideal policies of the pivotal MSs.  
First, suppose the EP and the Commission are both located between the pivotal MSs. 
Then the “gridlock interval”, i.e. the set of status quos that cannot be changed, is the same 
under both procedures. It is the set [pa,pb] of policies between the ideal policies of the two 
pivotal MSs. There is gridlock, and thus no room for CAP reform, if no qualified majority 
agrees.  
Second, suppose the EP (Commission) is located between the pivotal MSs, but the 
Commission (EP) is not. Then the gridlock interval is smaller under co-decision 
(consultation). In some instances the Commission (EP) does not agree with a qualified 
majority, which leads to more gridlock under consultation (co-decision). Under co-decision 
(consultation) CAP reform then does not occur only if the status quo is between the ideal 
policies of the pivotal MSs, whereas under consultation (co-decision) CAP reform is also 
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blocked if the status quo is between the ideal policies of the Commission (EP) and the closer 
pivotal MS. 
Third, if neither the EP nor the Commission is located between the pivotal MSs, then 
the gridlock interval is smaller under co-decision (consultation) if the EP (Commission) is 
closer to the closer pivotal MS. Then there are fewer instances in which the EP (Commission) 
disagrees with a qualified majority, which leads to less gridlock and more opportunities for 
CAP reform under co-decision (consultation), assuming that all status quos are equally likely. 
Figure 6 compares the equilibrium policies under consultation and co-decision, as a 
function of the location of the status quo, for the same configuration of preferences as in 
Figures 4 and 5. The broken line represents the equilibrium policy under consultation, 
whereas the solid line stands for the equilibrium policy under co-decision. For the specific  
configuration of preferences which we used to draw Figure 6, the gridlock interval is larger 
under co-decision than under consultation, because the EP is farther away from the closer 
pivotal MS than is the Commission.  
 
--- Figure 6 about here --- 
 
Whether gridlock does occur on a particular issue depends on the location of the status 
quo. If the Commission wants to reduce agricultural subsidies, for example, but the EP and a 
qualified majority want an increase, then there is gridlock under consultation, but the EP and 
a qualified majority may be able to push through an increase under co-decision. If the 
Commission and a qualified majority want to reduce subsidies, but the EP wants to increase 
them, there is gridlock under co-decision, but the Commission and a qualified majority are 
able to reduce subsidies under consultation. 
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 If reform does occur, the extent of the reform depends on the location of the ideal 
policies and, under co-decision, the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the 
Commission favors a larger reduction in agricultural subsidies than do the EP and a qualified 
majority, then the introduction of co-decision will result in a smaller cut. The same is true if 
the EP or the pivotal MS want a larger cut than does the Commission, but have little 
bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the EP has sufficient bargaining powers 
and wants a further reduction than does the Commission, or the MSs with bargaining powers 
want a further reduction, then the introduction of co-decision leads to a larger reduction in 
subsidies.  
As far as the balance of powers between the institutions is concerned, our analysis  
shows a clear transfer of powers from the Commission to the EP and the MSs. Whether the 
EP benefits more from this transfer than the MSs and which MSs benefit more, depends on 
the location of their ideal policies and their bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. 
The transfer of power is particularly evident in situations with extreme status quos. In those 
situations the equilibrium policy depends on the bargaining powers of the EP and MSs in the 
Conciliation Committee. Moreover, the EP can impose the status quo and block unwanted 
reforms if it does not agree with a qualified majority on the direction of change.  
 We now study how the location of the EP affects the prospects for CAP reform. 
Suppose that the pivotal MSs and the Commission all want to move to the left and that the 
Commission wants to move farther than the pivotal MSs, as was the case in the previous 
figures. The EP then blocks CAP reform if it wants to move in the opposite direction away 
from the status quo, say, if it wants an increase in subsidies rather than a reduction. Assume 
for simplicity that the EP has all the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. Then 
the EP obtains its ideal policy if it wants to move in the same direction as a qualified majority 
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and does not want to move farther than the pivotal MS is willing to accept. If it wants to move 
farther, it obtains the policy that makes the pivotal MS indifferent to the status quo. 
These results are illustrated in Figure 7. The solid line represents EU policy under co-
decision as a function of the position of the EP. We distinguish three intervals. Interval I is 
left of the policy 2pb-q that makes MS b indifferent to the status quo. In this interval the EP 
and a qualified majority want a move to the left, but the EP cannot propose its ideal policy 
because MS b, which is pivotal for a move to the left does not want to move that far left. The 
EP then successfully proposes the most leftist policy MS b accepts, policy 2pb-q. In interval II 
the EP successfully proposes its ideal policy, because the EP and a qualified majority want to 
move left and prefer the EP‟s ideal policy to the status quo. In interval III, right of the status 
quo, the EP blocks any move by the Council and there is gridlock. In this interval the EP 
wants a move to the right, whereas a qualified majority prefers a move to the left. The results 
would be similar if a MS had all the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee.
11
  
 
--- Figure 7 about here --- 
 
Figure 7 also compares the equilibrium policy under co-decision to the equilibrium 
policy under consultation. Under consultation a strongly pro-reform Commission successfully 
proposes the policy 2pb-q that makes MS b indifferent to the status quo, whatever the position 
of the EP. This is indicated by the broken line. Less reform-minded Commissions would 
propose less reform, in the same way as a less reform-minded EP proposes less reform under 
co-decision.
12
  
The introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for CAP reform if the EP wants 
less reform than does the Commission. The extent of reform also depends on the bargaining 
powers in the Conciliation Committee, however. Whether co-decision leads to more or less 
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reform than consultation thus hinges on who has bargaining powers in the Conciliation 
Committee. If the Commission is more pro-reform than are the EP and the MSs with 
bargaining powers, the use of co-decision reduces the extent of CAP reform. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this study we used spatial models of EU decision making to examine the effects of 
changes in the legislative procedure on CAP decision making. The move from the 
consultation to the co-decision procedure has led to a redistribution of formal legislative 
powers between the Commission and the EP. As pointed out in the literature, the Commission 
loses the formal powers it had under consultation. At the same time the EP gains legislative 
influence over the policy outcome. Formally, co-decision requires that the Council and the EP 
agree on a policy in order to positively close a co-decision dossier. This is the main difference 
with respect to consultation in which the EP exerts a consultative role with no direct influence 
over legislation.  
The consequences of the move from consultation to co-decision depend on the 
preferences of the EP, the Commission and the MSs, the location of the status quo and the 
bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the EP and the MSs with bargaining 
powers in the Conciliation Committee are more (less) opposed to reform than is the 
Commission, the use of co-decision leads to less (more) reform. If both the Commission and 
the EP want more (less) reform than the pivotal MSs, the move to co-decision has little 
impact, and the little impact there is depends on the bargaining powers of the EP in the 
Conciliation Committee.  
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Appendix  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium conditions under consultation 
 
We assume for simplicity and without loss of generality that the status quo 0q . We 
further assume that there is a qualified majority in favor of a move to the left ( 0bp ). 
So, we consider leftward moves only. The analysis is analogous if there is a qualified 
majority in favor of a move to the right ( 0ap ). If there is no qualified majority in 
favor of a move to the right or left, the status quo prevails.  
 
o Stage four. 
 Suppose the proposal was not successfully amended. MS k then votes in favor of 
the proposed policy Pp if and only if it is closer to its ideal policy kp  than is the 
status quo. That is, if and only if ( ) ( ) | | | |k p k p k kU P U q P p q p     |. 
Otherwise it votes against. The proposal is adopted if and only if MS b votes in 
favor, that is, if | | | |p b bP p q p   . Otherwise the status quo prevails. 
 The same holds for the amendment, if the proposal was successfully amended in 
stages two and three. 
 In any case the outcome in stage four is in the qualified majority set ],2[ qpb . 
o Stage three. 
 Suppose the proposal and the amendment would both be adopted in stage four. 
In stage three a MS then votes in favor of the amendment am if it is closer to the 
MS‟s ideal policy than is the proposal. The amendment is thus approved in stage 
three, if it is closer to all MSs‟ ideal policies than is the proposal. 
 Suppose the proposal would not be adopted in stage four, but the amendment 
would. In stage three a MS then votes in favor of the amendment if it is closer to 
the MS‟s ideal policy than is the status quo. The amendment is thus approved in 
stage three, if it is closer to all MSs‟ ideal policies than is the status quo. 
 Suppose the amendment would not be adopted in stage four. Then the MSs can 
do no better than vote against it in stage three. Thus, such an amendment is not 
approved in stage three. 
o  Stage two. 
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 Suppose the proposal would be adopted in stage four. An amendment can then 
be approved if there are policies that are closer to all MSs‟ ideal policies than is 
the proposal. This is the case if and only if the proposal is to the left (right) of all 
MSs‟ ideal policies. MS k then proposes as an amendment the policy it prefers 
most from among the policies that are closer to all the MSs‟ ideal policies than is 
the proposal. This amendment is approved in stage three and adopted in stage 
four. Moreover, it is such that there is no policy preferred to it by all MSs. That 
is, it is in the qualified majority set and in the amendment set ],[ 1 npp . 
 Suppose the proposal would not be adopted in stage four. An amendment can 
then be approved if there are policies that are closer to all MSs‟ ideal policies 
than is the status quo. This is the case if and only if the status quo is to the right 
of all MSs‟ ideal policies. MS k then proposes as an amendment the policy it 
prefers most from among the policies that are closer to all the MSs‟ ideal 
policies than is the status quo. This amendment is approved in stage three and 
adopted in stage four. Moreover, it is such that there is no policy preferred to it 
by all MSs. That is, it is in the qualified majority set and in the amendment set. 
o Stage one.   
 Whether or not the Commission proposes a policy that is in the qualified 
majority and amendment sets, the policy that is adopted is in those sets. The 
Commission then proposes the policy in the consultation set 
],[]0,2[ 1 nb pppCS   it prefers most.  
 The Commission‟s optimal proposal strategy is then as follows. If its ideal 
policy is right of the status quo ( 0Cp ) or right of MS n‟s ideal policy, it 
proposes the status quo ( 0)pP   or MS n‟s ideal policy, whichever is most to 
the left. If its ideal policy is left of the policy bp2  that makes MS b indifferent to 
the status quo or left of MS 1‟s ideal policy, it proposes policy bp2  or MS 1‟s 
ideal policy, whichever is most to the right. Otherwise it proposes its ideal policy 
Cp . 
o The Commission proposal is adopted and becomes the EU policy CSEUp  under 
consultation. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium under Co-decision 
 
o Stage five. 
 When considering the joint text MS k votes in favor of the proposed policy jt if 
and only if it is closer to its ideal policy kp  than is the status quo. That is, if and 
only if kkkk pqpjtqUjtU  |||)()( |. Otherwise it votes against. 
 The joint text is adopted if and only if MS b votes in favor, that is, if 
|||| bb pqpjt  . Otherwise the status quo prevails. 
o Stage four. 
 The EP proposes as a joint text the policy it prefers most from among the 
policies that are preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority, the policies 
that are in the qualified majority set. 
o Stages three and two. 
 The EP and the MSs vote in favor of the Commission proposal if they prefer it to 
the joint text. The proposal is adopted if the EP and a qualified majority prefer it 
to the joint text.  
 A proposal that is preferred by a qualified majority to the joint text, which is 
preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority, is also preferred to the status 
quo by a qualified majority.  
 Therefore, there is no proposal preferred to the joint text by the EP and a 
qualified majority, except the joint text itself. If there were such a proposal, the 
EP would propose it as a joint text.  
o Stage one. 
 As a result the Commission can do no better than to propose the joint text. This 
proposal is adopted and becomes the EU policy CDEUp  under co-decision. 
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Figure 1: The Sequence of Events under the Consultation Procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Sequence of Events under the Co-decision Procedure. 
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Figure 3: Policy Making and the Distribution of Preferences. 
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Figure 4: The Effect of the Location of the Status Quo on EU Policy under Consultation. 
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Figure 5: The Effect of the Location of the Status Quo on EU Policy under Co-decision. 
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Figure 6: A Comparison between Consultation and Co-decision. 
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Figure 7: The Impact of EP Preferences on CAP Reform. 
 
 
Policy under 
Consulation 
Policy under Co-
decision 
2pb-q 
2pb-q 
I II III 
Equilibrium 
 Policy 
EP position pb pc pa q 
pc 
pa 
pb 
q 
 36 
 
                                                 
1
 The Lisbon Treaty renamed the co-decision procedure. It is now called the ordinary legislative procedure. 
2
 The Commission can also decide to include MS amendments in its proposal, rather than have the Council vote 
on them. 
3
 The Amsterdam Treaty also increased the EP‟s powers under co-decision. Until the adoption of the Amsterdam 
Treaty the Council had the right to reintroduce the version of the legislation it had approved in the first reading, 
if the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee broke down. 
4
 In the first two readings amendments that are not approved by the Commission require support from a 
unanimous Council and the EP for adoption. The requirements in the Conciliation Committee are thus less strict 
and are therefore the ones that matter in the end. The EP can also amend a proposal, in the first and second 
readings, with the support of the Commission, but in a complete information model the Commission would not 
amend its own proposal. For these reasons we ignore first and second reading amendments under co-decision. 
5 This assumption does not affect our conclusions, as will be seen below.  
6
 Our conclusions extend to multidimensional settings. See Crombez (2000). 
7
 In other words Black's median voter theorem applies (Black 1958). 
8
 A MS‟s number of votes depends on the size of its population. The largest MS, Germany, has 29 votes; the 
smallest, Cyprus, has two. A qualified majority also requires the support of a majority of the MSs, and these 
MSs need to represent at least 62 percent of EU population. For simplicity we ignore these two requirements in 
this paper. The qualified majority rule will change in 2014. 
9  If the Commission had been to the left of MS 1 gridlock between the Commission and a qualified majority in 
the Council could be broken by a unanimous Council. The gridlock interval is then [p1,pb]. A similar reasoning 
applies if the Commission is to the right of MS n. 
10 The Commission is sometimes considered to have gatekeeping rights. That is, it is sometimes assumed that the 
Commission can refuse to make a proposal. In that case there is also gridlock under co-decision when the 
Commission and a qualified majority disagree on the direction of change. The gridlock interval is then always 
(weakly) larger under co-decision than under consultation. See Crombez, et al. (2006) for a discussion of 
gatekeeping rights in the EU. Consistent with their conclusions we do not assume that the Commission has 
gatekeeping rights in this paper.  
11
 If MS b had all the bargaining powers, for example, interval I would stretch past MS b‟s ideal policy, up to the 
policy (pb+q)/2, the midpoint between the status quo and MS b‟s ideal policy. MS b‟s ideal policy would then be 
the equilibrium policy under co-decision in this interval. In the interval between the policy (pb+q)/2 and q, the 
equilibrium policy would be the policy 2pP–q that makes the EP indifferent to the status quo. In interval III the 
equilibrium policy would be the status quo. 
12 In particular a Commission with ideal policy in interval II would successfully propose its own ideal policy 
under consultation. A Commission with ideal policy in interval III would propose the status quo. We assume 
here that the most left MS is located left of policy 2pb–q and that the most right MS is located right of the status 
quo.  
